CA7: AEDPA Fourth Amendment IAC reversal; state court unreasonably found underlying search issue meritless
Rarity: Habeas corpus granted on a IAC Fourth Amendment claim where the Indiana Court of Appeals was found to have unreasonably applied the Fourth Amendment in finding that defense counsel was not ineffective for not addressing defendant’s pro se issue that the search of his wheelbarrow was unreasonable. It was unreasonable to conclude that defendant would not have prevailed on the search issue. [A really interesting case.] Gentry v. Sevier, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4030 (7th Cir. February 26, 2010):
As explained above, the record reflects that the searches performed by the officers at the scene of Gentry’s arrest were unconstitutional and there is thus no indication that a motion to suppress evidence resulting from such searches would have been futile. See A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 795 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[i]f there was no underlying constitutional violation, a motion to suppress would have been futile and counsel could not be viewed as ineffective for failing to present such a motion”). We recognize that trial strategies are generally left to the discretion of counsel and second-guessing strategic decisions in hindsight will generally not be a meritorious basis to find ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Smith v. Gaetz, 565 F.3d 346, 352-53 (7th Cir. 2009). However, in this case, the decision by Gentry’s trial counsel not to seek to suppress evidence based on a violation of Gentry’s Fourth Amendment rights is beyond the pale of an objectively reasonable strategy. The application of the fundamental principles of Fourth Amendment case law to Gentry’s situation should have been apparent to his trial counsel. The record does not indicate that any strategic benefit would have been accorded to Gentry by his trial counsel’s failure to seek the suppression of the evidence. Gentry even brought the suppression issue to the attention of his counsel by filing a pro se motion to suppress and yet, even then, his counsel failed to attempt to suppress the evidence. Gentry has shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he suffered prejudice. The record does not reflect what evidence could have been used to convict Gentry excluding the garage door opener, the identities of the residents, the stolen items and the evidence found in the wheelbarrow. We conclude that the Court of Appeals of Indiana unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) to the facts in this case.
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For the above stated reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals of Indiana unreasonably applied federal law when the Court determined that the evidence concerning the search of the wheelbarrow was admissible and held that Gentry’s counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.


